Abstract: This paper explores the influence of Japan and the United States over the geographic distribution of Asian Development Bank (ADB) funds. Although nominally an independent, multilateral organization, the ADB is widely regarded as bowing to the interests of its two most influential donors. Estimation using panel data for less developed Asian countries from 1968 to 2002 suggests significant donor influence with inconsistent weight placed on humanitarian criteria given limited funding for the region's largest countries, China and India. Comparing the results with research on World Bank loan allocation suggests donor interests are relatively more important in the ADB. This finding justifies the existence of the ADB on political grounds but calls into question its relative merits on economic grounds.
poverty, India might consume too large a share of the institution's resources and, in a sense, dominate the institution. Wihtol concludes that "the allocation of lending by country...[is] largely a reflection of the political and economic concerns of the [Asian Development] Bank's donors" (Wihtol, 1988: 173) .
III. Estimation Methods and Data
The basic approach in this paper is similar to Fleck and Kilby (2005) . Since some less developed Asian countries receive no ADB disbursements in some years, I estimate a two part model with a selection equation and an allocation equation. The equations include variables consistent with the ADB's charter, i.e., measures of recipient need and ability to use aid well (aid effectiveness), plus donor-specific variables that reflect the donor's commercial and geopolitical interests in the recipient country. The two part model includes a selection equation (estimated via probit) where the dependent variable indicates whether or not a country received ADB funds in a given year. A separate allocation equation is estimated for the sample that does receive ADB funding; the dependent variable is the share of ADB funds received. The chief limitations of a two part model are: (1) interpretation of the allocation equation coefficients as conditional on selection; and (2) the assumption that the unobserved factors influencing selection and the unobserved factors influencing allocation are uncorrelated (independence of equations). If independence holds, it is possible to construct unconditional estimates. A Heckman selection model (Type 2 tobit that does not require independence of equations) fails to reject independence of the equations for most samples and specifications while also imposing practical limits on model specification. This approach is more general than a tobit model as the selection and allocation equations can differ (e.g., population or GDP can play different roles in a country's "graduation" from the ADB than in the allocation of funds to countries that have not yet graduated). Neumayer (2003) applies a two part model to aid allocation; for a textbook treatment, see Cameron and Trivedi (2005, 544-546, 680-681) .
A number of difficult specification issues arise in almost every aid allocation estimation.
There is as yet no consensus on what form of dependent variable to use; indeed, different forms are useful for answering different questions. Depending on their focus, previous studies have used the level of aid in year t to recipient i (A it ), aid per capita (A it /N it ), aid as a share of GDP (A it /Y it ), or aid to recipient i as a share of the donor's aid to all countries (A it /E j A jt ). The level of aid is straightforward; policy debates are typically cast in these terms. Aid per capita captures how much aid "should" go to the recipient and has been used extensively in donor interest-recipient need models (i.e., testing neo-realist versus idealist interpretations of aid). Aid as a share of GDP is a key measure for questions of growth (Burnside and Dollar, 2000) , aid dependency (O'Connell and Soludo, 2001) , and the degree of donor leverage but is not closely tied to certain standard rationale for aid allocation. 4 This paper employs aid as a share of the donor's overall regional aid to capture directly the relative importance of one recipient versus another. That is, do countries favored by Japan or the U.S. have better access to ADB funding? Aid shares emerge as a natural measure of aid flows in some theoretical models of aid allocation (Fleck and Kilby, 2005; Trumbull and Wall, 1994) .
Certain independent variables are easily expressed in shares (e.g., population share it = N it /E j N jt , export share it = EX it /E j EX jt ) while others are not (e.g., GDP per capita, degree of democracy).
In a simple two part model, the ADB first decides whether a country is eligible for loan disbursements. The selection equation summarizes this decision with a latent "eligibility" variable can play different roles in the selection and allocation decisions. A key assumption of a two part model is that unobserved factors influencing selection and allocation are uncorrelated, i.e., E(< it , it ) = 0. The hypothesis of no donor influence is " " " " 1 = 0, " " " " 2 = 0, $ $ $ $ 1 = 0 and $ $ $ $ 2 = 0.
The set of variables included in Q could be sizable. Just considering recipient need, the Millennium Development Goals set out 6 social goals with 16 indicators (United Nations, 2005) .
Add to this measures of aid effectiveness. These data requirements present a serious problem because, beyond the most basic measures (population, GDP, degree of democracy), year and country coverage is spotty. In an analysis of the allocation of aid between countries, one stands to lose a lot from reduced country coverage. In addition, the sample of countries reporting data is unlikely to be random; countries with closer ties to Japan and the U.S. are more likely to collect and report data. 5 Even setting aside issues of sample coverage, using a large number of variables may not capture perceived recipient need or aid effectiveness well if inaccuracies in reported data are known to aid agencies or if the relationship between the data and the abstract concepts of interest is complex. On this latter point, consider a PPP measure of GDP per capita, seemingly the nature proxy for recipient need. Even this measure has shortcomings: it ignores important distributional issues, correlates with aid effectiveness, and may proxy for donor self-interest (e.g., market potential). Such multiple correlations have plagued interpretation of results in the literature.
The ideal Q would be a rating by a well-informed, humanitarian expert or organization that knows the shortcomings of official data and weighs trade-offs between need and effectiveness. This assessment should be that of the aid community since the goal is not to look for "mistakes" the ADB might make in pursuing humanitarian goals but rather is to uncover elements of the aid allocation process that are not based on humanitarian considerations.
A version of such a humanitarian rating is available. As discussed above, a group of small donors-Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden-arguably pursue humanitarian goals in the allocation of their aid. Thus, one can view small donor aid share as the humanitarian rating. Since individual small donors may limit the scope of their programs, the small donor aggregate is appropriate. One benefit of using small donor bilateral aid data is that they come from the OECD and are not subject to the limited coverage or uncertain provenance of other LDC data.
The key advantage of using small donor aid to proxy for need is that, because small donors are small, they do not have the power to influence ADB lending significantly. Strand (1999) finds that the ADB's voting system reduces the voting power of small donors. For example, the 1990 Johnston voting power indices were: Japan .174, the U.S. .174, Canada .081, Denmark 0, the Netherlands 0, Norway 0, and Sweden 0. Because small donors are relatively powerless in the ADB, they need not be totally or even mostly humanitarian. Small donor aid is an effective proxy if it has a humanitarian component and small donors do not cater to Japan, the U.S., or the ADB bureaucracy.
Donor interest variables (Z) present a similar set of problems. For some potentially important variables (e.g., FDI), coverage is poor and definitions are inconsistent across countries and over time. Again, the relationship between variables and donor interests may be complex and variable. A military base may be important to the donor at one point in time but simply an expense at another juncture. Commercial interest often hinge on future expectations rather than current markets. Finally, donor interest measures should be symmetric for Japan and the U.S. As above, the ideal would be donor ratings of a country's commercial and political importance.
Again, a version of such donor interest ratings is available in the form of bilateral aid shares. However, two more difficult issues do arise. First, Japanese and U.S. interests may coincide (e.g., a country with oil reserves and market potential-Indonesia-may be of interest to both) or Japan may simply follow the U.S. lead as a form of burden sharing or gaiatsu (Hickman, 1993; Katada, 1997; Tuman et al., 2001; Tuman and Ayoub, 2004; Tuman and Strand, 2006) . Bilateral aid data cannot distinguish between coinciding interests and gaiatsu, complicating attribution. Fortunately, in Asia, this problem is substantially reduced since there is little evidence of Japanese bilateral aid following U.S. interests in this region (Tuman and Strand, 2006) . The second issue is whether donor aid allocations are negatively coordinated: the small donors may choose to specialize in countries because they receive less aid from large donors such as Japan, the U.S. and the ADB. The limited empirical research on this topic provides no clear overall pattern.
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The discussion above is summarized in the following modified selection and allocation equations: The Q variables come from several data sources. Population and GDP figures are constructed from the Penn World Tables (Heston et al., 2002) and the World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2004) ; the index of democracy is from the Polity IV Project (2000) . These variables are lagged by one year to better reflect the information set when the ADB makes allocation decisions. GDP is per capita in PPP terms using 1996 dollars. The democracy index places countries on a scale of -10 (autocracy) to 10 (democracy). following Thacker (1999) and Dreher and Jensen (2007) which ranges from 0 (always voting the opposite) to 1 (always voting the same). India, 1971) with China, Mongolia, and Taiwan receiving no small donor aid for at least one year.
[ Table 1 about here]
Population share runs from 0.02% (Bahrain, 1996) to 48% (China, 1967) . PPP GDP per capita averages $3,676, ranging from $397 (Myanmar, 1968 ) to $24,939 (Singapore, 1996 . The share of world exports going to the country runs from 0% (Bangladesh, 1971; Bhutan, 1995) to 33%
(China, 1998); imports from 0% (Bangladesh, 1971; Bhutan, 1995) to 41% (China, 2000) . The share of Japan's exports going to the country runs from 0% (Bangladesh, 1971; Bhutan, 1995; Kyrgyz Republic, 1993 ) to 31% (China, 1985 ; imports from 0% for Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Fiji, and the Kyrgyz Republic (various years) to 44% (China, 1998) . The share of U.S. exports going to the country ranges from zero in various years for Bangladesh, China, Fiji, Laos, and Mongolia to 43% for India in 1966; imports from none (Bangladesh, China, and Fiji) to 45% (China, 2000) .
The democracy index averages 0.277, ranging from a low of -9 (31 observations on seven countries) to the highest possible value of 10 (Malaysia, 1967-68 and Papua New Guinea).
The UN alignment variable can be constructed for 516 of the observations in the full sample.
UN alignment with Japan averages 0.736, ranging from 0.472 (Pakistan, 1967) and India (before 1987) from ADB borrowing drives many of the differences between the two samples. ADB loans share (s ADB ) reaches a maximum of over 50% (Korea, 1969) . Japanese aid and U.S. aid are slightly higher in the restricted sample while small donor aid is slightly lower. The exclusion of China and India from the early part of the sample largely accounts for lower average population while Singapore's effective graduation (and Korea's temporary graduation) from the ADB accounts for lower average GDP. Korea (during the 1998 Asian financial crisis) sets the maximum GDP per capita for a country receiving ADB funds. Again, the absence of China and
India from the earlier part of the sample lowers trade averages. Korea (1996) is now the top destination of U.S. exports. Perhaps the most notable change is the rise in mean democracy score in the restricted sample. 14 The sample is reduced to 435 observations for UN alignment.
IV. Estimation Results
This section presents estimation results for the selection and allocation equations. [ Table 2 about here]
The negative and significant population coefficient indicates that the probability of receiving ADB funds is significantly lower for more populous countries, a pattern apparently at odds with a humanitarian rationale for aid. Evaluated at the mean values for all other variables, the predicted probability of receiving ADB funds in equation (2.1) falls by 35 percentage points when population share increases from the mean to one standard deviation above the mean (from 6.1% to 18.3%).
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This reflects the exclusion of China and India from ADB borrowing prior to 1986/87; the estimated population coefficient is negative but statistically insignificant in a sample that drops China and India prior to 1987.
In contrast, the negative and significant estimated coefficient for GDP per capita is consistent with a humanitarian rationale for lending. Ceteris paribus, increasing GDP per capita to one standard deviation above the sample mean (from $3,680 to $7,410) reduces the predicted probability of receiving ADB funds by 16 percentage points. Because this predicted probability differential is smaller than that for population, one can only say that ADB eligibility reflects humanitarian factors when setting aside China and India before 1987. However, doing so reduces the magnitude and significance of the coefficient on GDP per capita. The predicted probability differential from the above difference in GDP per capita falls to five percentage points.
The democracy index consistently enters with a positive and significant coefficient. With other variables set at the sample mean, the predicted probability of receiving ADB funds increases by 18 percentage points when moving from the lowest democracy rating in the sample (-9) to the highest (10). Thus, a country's chances of receiving ADB funds increase with its level of democratization.
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Small donor aid share (s SD ) enters with a negative though fairly small and statistically insignificant coefficient across the selection equation estimates (though approaching significance in the UN alignment sample). Thus, ceteris paribus, countries that receive more small donor aid (for humanitarian or other reasons) are not more likely to get ADB funding.
Turning to trade variables, World exports enter with a positive and significant estimated coefficient. The predicted probability of receiving ADB funds increases by 48 percentage points when moving from zero to the mean level of World export share (6.1%). 17 The differential impact of Japan importing goods from the country is also positive and statistically significant though smaller; the equivalent probability differential is 14 percentage points. This positive result is consistent with the political economy of Japanese trade policy. A significant amount of Japanese imports from less developed Asian countries are essential raw materials or intermediate goods in the supply chain orchestrated by Japanese firms. Japanese exports also enter with a positive coefficient though it is substantially smaller and statistically insignificant.
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In contrast, the sizeable negative and significant estimated coefficient for U.S. exports does not fit well with the political economy of U.S. trade policy; countries that buy a larger share of U.S.
exports are less likely to receive ADB funds, ceteris paribus. This link is robust in a number of respects. It persists across the three specifications in Table 2 and across different time periods. It is not driven by a few countries (such as Korea and Singapore-which trade a lot with U.S. but have effectively graduated from the ADB-or China and India). Finally, it does not appear to be driven by outliers as a quadratic term proves insignificant. Ceteris paribus, a one standard deviation increase in U.S. exports (from the mean of 6.1% to 13.7%) decreases the predicted probability of receiving ADB funds by 40 percentage points. One could imagine that the U.S. looks at export growth potential (as proxied by a small share of current U.S. exports). However, the same story does not carry-over to the level of ADB funding.
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The share of U.S. imports coming from the country also enters negatively-in this case consistent with the political economy of U.S. trade policy which vilifies countries selling to the U.S.
as dumping goods and stealing jobs-but the coefficient is small and statistically insignificant throughout.
Both Japanese and U.S. bilateral aid shares (s Going from no Japanese aid to the average share increases the predicted probability of receiving ADB funds by seven percentage points while the same comparison for U.S. aid predicts a six percentage point increase. Recalling the earlier result, the probability of receiving ADB funds increases with Japanese or American bilateral aid but does not increase with aid from the small donors.
Column 2.2 reports results for the UN sample without UN variables. The sample shrinks from 574 to 516 observations as Bangladesh, China, Republic of Korea and Taiwan have no UN data for certain years. Comparing column (2.2) with those on the left and right, it is evident that the (few) changes are due to the reduced sample (2.1 to 2.2) rather than the inclusion of the UN variables (2.2 to 2.3).
The first notable difference is the estimated trade coefficients. All decrease in absolute value except the Japanese and U.S. export coefficients. The change is particularly striking for the import variables, with the World import coefficient shrinking by a factor of 17 (though insignificant in both specifications) and U.S. and Japanese import coefficients falling by two thirds or more. With the drop in magnitude, the Japanese import coefficient is no longer statistically significant.
Conversely, the estimated coefficient on Japanese exports doubles in magnitude and approaches statistical significance. 20 It comes as no surprise that trade coefficients change substantially since the data points omitted are for very large traders (China, Korea, Taiwan) and very small traders (Bangladesh).
The second change is a slight reversal between the Japanese and U.S. aid share coefficients with the latter gaining in size and statistical significance and the former falling in size and statistical significance. Repeating the previous simulations, going from no Japanese aid to a 6.1% share increases the predicted probability of receiving ADB funds by three percentage points while the same change for U.S. aid share results in a six percentage point increase.
Turning to UN voting alignment, the Japanese UN voting coefficient is positive but statistically insignificant. The U.S. UN voting coefficient is about the same magnitude but negative and again statistically insignificant. The sign of the Japanese coefficient is consistent with Japan's much publicized bid for a seat on the security council (Drifte, 2000) ; Japanese influence over access to ADB funds could be used to reward countries that vote with Japan in the UN. A more strategic approach (akin to a swing voter model) might target countries that are neither clear allies nor clear enemies; however, the data show no evidence of such a strategy. 21 Thus, as measured by UN alignment with Japan or the U.S., there is no evidence that UN voting has a significant influence on ADB eligibility in the full sample.
What is the overall importance of recipient need versus donor interest in determining access to ADB funding? While GDP per capita and democracy go in the "right" direction, population and small donor aid (though not significant) do not. In a one to one comparison, the effect of GDP per capita is larger than that of either Japanese or U.S. bilateral aid but smaller than the trade effects (Japanese imports or U.S. exports). Democracy is on par with bilateral aid effects but also smaller than trade effects. Simulations based on (2.1) confirm the dominance of donor interests. Increasing "recipient need" by one standard deviation (population up from 6.1% to 18.3%, GDP per capita down from $3,676 to 0, and democracy up from 0.28 to 6.90) should raise the predicted probability of receiving ADB funds. Decreasing the unambiguous donor interest variables by one standard deviation (Japanese imports from 6.1% to 0, Japanese aid share from 6.1% to 0, and U.S. aid share from 6.1% to 0) should decrease the predicted probability. The combined effect of these changes is a 56 percentage point decrease in the predicted probability of receiving ADB funds. Repeating the exercise but excluding the effects of China and India pre-1987, the predicted probability falls by over 70 percentage points. 22 Thus, by this measure, the donor interest variables appear to dominate eligibility for ADB funds.
[ Table 3 about here]
The allocation equation in Table 3 India from the estimation sample, the quadratic term is insignificant and, dropping it, the estimated population coefficient is 1.6: a one percentage point higher population share is associated with a 1.6 percentage point higher ADB loan share, ceteris paribus. Thus, there are both parallels and contrasts with the selection equation. In both cases, there is "discrimination" against China and India due to their size (and potential to absorb the bulk of the ADB's funds). However, setting aside China and India, population is an important determinant for allocation but not for selection. alternative is again to exclude China and India; re-estimating (3.1) and using standard deviations from the restricted sample yields a more modest 2 percentage point increase in the predicted ADB loan share. Another alternative is to estimate (3.1) with only a linear population term so that the simulation does not depend on the starting point. This variation yields a small reversal with a 0.8 percentage point decrease in predicted ADB loan share. Overall, humanitarian factors dominate the allocation of ADB funds between eligible countries only when not considering the disproportionately small allocations to China and India.
[ Table 4 about here] In column (4.1), the pre-1987 population coefficients (positive linear, negative quadratic)
indicate an allocation bias against larger countries even without China and India. The estimated marginal effect of population is negative for population shares over 3% (notably Bangladesh and Indonesia). The post-1986 population coefficients (column (4.2)) more closely mirror those for the overall period with the estimated marginal effect of population negative for shares above 21%, again affecting only China and India. And, as in the overall period, excluding China and India from the estimation sample, the quadratic term is insignificant and, dropping it, the estimated population coefficient is 1.5.
GDP per capita enters with a negative coefficient (consistent with need-based allocation) in both periods but is not statistically significant in either period individually. This appears to be simply the result of the smaller sample sizes as the variation in GDP per capita (in PPP terms and only for countries receiving ADB funding) is essentially the same in the sub-periods as in the overall sample.
The estimated coefficient for Democracy is positive and marginally significant in the earlier period (p=0.06); it becomes negative, very small, and far from significant in the second period. This provides evidence that the link between ADB funding and democracy has changed over time but the nature of this change is unclear. The spread of democracy is considerable; in the unconditional sample, the mean of the index is -1.2 in the first period and 1.8 in the second. The sample selection rule may also have changed. The average democracy score is higher in the ADB eligible sample than in the overall sample for the second period (2.5 versus 1.8) but not for the first. Re-estimating the selection equation with separate first and second period democracy variables reveals that the democracy selection effect is basically in the second period. Finally, unconditional estimates -either an FGLS with AR1 (not correcting for zeros) or a Tobit (not correcting for heteroskedasticity or autocorrelation) on the unconditional sample -find a larger positive coefficient in the first period with a p-value of 0.06. Putting these pieces together, the most straightforward interpretation is that the ADB's consideration of democracy has shifted from allocation to selection but the overall effect may have been to reduce the importance of democracy as a determinant of funding.
Turning to donor interest variables, an interesting pattern of increasing influence emerges.
While neither Japanese nor U.S. aid shares are significant in the early period, both enter with positive and significant coefficients in the later period. It is clear that in the overall sample receiving aid (Table 3) Japanese bilateral aid and higher U.S. bilateral aid are both associated with more ADB funding, with the link three times larger for Japanese bilateral aid. Voting alignment with Japan in the UN is associated with less ADB funding in the first half of the estimation period and with more ADB funding in the second half, the latter result driven by China and India.
Overall, the evidence suggests that both Japan and the U.S. have systematic influence over the distribution of ADB funds. Whether examining selection or allocation, discrimination against China (attributed to U.S. Cold War politics) and India (driven by Japanese concerns) overshadows other potentially humanitarian aspects of ADB lending. In a similar study of the World Bank, Fleck and Kilby (2005) find that the single largest factor is population with more funds going to larger countries. The influence of U.S. interests is roughly on par with that of humanitarian factors other than population. The ADB case differs in that humanitarian considerations play a less apparent role.
In this sense, donor interests more heavily influence the allocation of resources in the ADB than in the World Bank.
1. The distinction between voting weight (the proportion of overall votes held by a member) and formal voting power (an a priori measure of a member's ability to influence outcomes given the voting weights of each member and the voting rules) is important. For a discussion of these issues and applications to international financial institutions see Strand (1999 Strand ( , 2001 .
2. See Neumayer (2003) for a survey. In the international relations literature, this dichotomy is cast as neo-realist versus idealist explanations for aid flows. Following the literature on aid allocation, I use the term "humanitarian" to describe aid flows that correlate with recipient need and/or development effectiveness; I do not consider whether the donor is truly altruistic or not (e.g., seeking
a "warm glow" or the appearance of altruism).
3. The distinction between geopolitical and commercial interests may be spurious for Japan since it is a economic rather than military superpower.
4. For example, discussions about how to allocation aid based on recipient need are unlikely to focus on the aid to GDP ratio. Consider a donor that gives the same absolute amount of aid to every country regardless of GDP. For two countries with the same population size but one poor and one rich, equal aid results in a high aid to GDP ratio in the poor country and a low aid to GDP ratio in the rich country. More generally, negative coefficient estimates in a regression of GDP per capita on the aid to GDP ratio do not necessarily reflect need-based aid allocation. With a log-log specification (when appropriate), the solution is straightforward: log( ) = $ log( ) is equivalent to log( ) = (1+$) log( ), implying need-based allocation only if $<!1.
However, in a linear specification, results are difficult to interpret. In contrast, the aid to GDP ratio may be very appropriate when the issue is a donor rewarding recipient behavior (e.g., UN voting).
5. For example in a probit analysis, countries that trade more with the U.S. and receive more U.S. 7. Estimation of a random effects probit had computational problems; results depended on the number of integration points even up to the system's limit (195 for STATA 9). In any case, Guilkey and Murphy (1993) report that a probit with panel corrected standard errors generally performs well when compared with a random effects probit. Incorporating fixed effects via a conditional logit would exclude countries that always or never get ADB funds-over one third of the observations.
8. There are two reasons to expect autocorrelation in the allocation equation. First, disbursements are likely to be correlated over time because loans disburse gradually. Second, institutional budgeting generates inertia for bureaucratic reasons and due to defensive lending. These sources of autocorrelation are primarily institutional so a single autocorrelation parameter is appropriate.
For all three specifications in Table 3 , a likelihood ratio test strong rejects the null hypothesis of no AR1 (p-0 for all three specifications).
The most obvious alternative to an AR1 specification is to include country fixed effects.
However, estimating Table 3 specifications including both fixed effects and AR1 fails to reject the null hypothesis of no fixed effects (p=0.30 for specification (3.1), p=0.23 for specification (3.2), and p=0.12 for specification (3.3)). In contrast, a likelihood ratio test strong rejects the null hypothesis of no AR1 (p-0 for all three specifications).
9. Even gross disbursement data have a few negative entries in exceptional circumstances (e.g., seizure of assets by other countries). In these few cases, gross disbursement is set to 0.
10. The denominators of all share variables are sums over the observations in the largest sample used (full sample selection equation in Table 2 ) so that shares are effectively normalized to sum to one in that sample.
11. For each dyad (Japan-recipient country i or US-recipient country i), I code vote agreement (yes-yes, no-no or abstain/absent-abstain/absent) as a 1, opposite votes (yes-no or no-yes) as a 0, and only one country abstaining/absent (yes/no-abstain/absent or abstain/absent-yes/no) as a 0.5. UN alignment is the mean across all recorded UNGA roll call votes in the given year. Under this method, a country is perfectly aligned with itself. I include all votes rather than a subset so that Japanese and U.S. variables will be more comparable. UN votes are not available for certain country-years: Bangladesh 1972 country-years: Bangladesh -1973 China 1967 China -1970 China , 1972 China -1973 Republic of Korea 1967 -1990 and Taiwan 1974-2001 . An alternative measure (Gartzke and Tucker's [1999] UN voting similarity, an application of Signorino and Ritter's [1999] S measure of similarity) is highly correlated with the variable constructed but available only through 1996. In that sample, the two measures give similar results.
12. Due to data availability, the full sample covers: Azerbaijan 1995 Azerbaijan -2002 Bahrain 1997; Bangladesh 1973 , Bhutan 1997 Cambodia 1994 Cambodia -2000 China 1968 China -2002 Fiji 1971 Fiji -2000 India 1968 India -2002 Indonesia 1968 Indonesia -2002 Kazakhstan 1995 Kazakhstan -2002 Republic of Korea 1968 Kyrgyz Republic 1995 Laos 1987 Laos -1992 Laos , 1997 Malaysia 1968 Malaysia -2002 Mongolia 1987 Mongolia -1991 Mongolia , 1997 Myanmar 1969 Myanmar -1990 Nepal 1968 Nepal -2002 Pakistan 1968 Pakistan -2002 Papua New Guinea 1976 Philippines 1968 Philippines -2002 Singapore 1968 Singapore -1997 Sri Lanka 1968 Taiwan 1969 Taiwan -1999 Tajikistan 1997 Tajikistan -2002 Thailand 1968 Thailand -2002 Turkmenistan 1997; and Uzbekistan 1995-1997. 13. The eligibility sample contains one observation on Bhutan (1997) . Although this has positive ADB lending, it drops from the allocation sample because of the AR1 specification.
14. The change in the average democracy score is not driven by the start of lending to China in 1986 since India enters in 1987 and the two largely cancel each other.
15. Subsequent predicted probability differentials also hold variables at sample means except as noted. 17. This comparison implies incompatible values for the trade variables (i.e., Japanese and U.S.
I also explored the
trade cannot be positive when world trade is zero) but does illustrate the magnitude of the effect.
18. An F-test rejects the hypothesis that the Japanese trade variables are jointly insignificant.
However, a specification that sums exports and imports as "trade" gives the opposite result:
Japanese trade share is positive but insignificant. Overall, the Japanese import effect is not very robust, falling in size and significance if a few extreme observations are dropped (e.g., early data points for Bangladesh).
19. Simple descriptive statistics reveal the same pattern as in the probit. The sample correlation between ADB eligible and U.S. export share is -0.27; the average U.S. export share is 5.1% for ADB eligible countries and 10.5% for others. A specification that sums exports and imports as "trade" yields comparable results: U.S. trade share is negative and significant. Only when using the actual share of ADB funds rather than the dichotomous variable is a positive correlation evident (0.14 in the overall sample, 0.35 in the ADB eligible sample).
20. An F-test falls to reject the hypothesis that the Japanese trade variables in (2.2) are jointly insignificant . A specification that sums exports and imports as "trade" yields comparable results:
Japanese trade share is positive but insignificant.
21. In a quadratic specification, the estimated coefficient on the linear terms are negative and and on squared terms positive (none significant). These are the opposite signs than would be expected in a strategic model; "swing voters" have a lower predicted probability of receiving ADB funding than either strong supporters or strong opponents. 0.572 0.559 0.563 Robust z statistics in parentheses; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% All specification include year dummies. 
